







A Political Theory of Russian Orthodoxy 





































Abstract: In this paper, I test the effects of religious norms on the provision of public goods. My 
evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in Tomsk 
and Novosibirsk, Russia. I introduce three treatments, which I define as degrees of Eastern 
Orthodox collectivist enforcement: 1. Solidarity, 2. Obedience, and 3. Universal discipline. I argue 
for the existence of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy in the Russian bureaucracy that facilitates the 
delivery of public goods under conditions of universal discipline and the principal’s 
overfulfillment. Eastern Orthodox hierarchy is enforced through universal disciplinary 
monitoring, which induces collective punishment when the public good is not delivered. Contrary 
to conventional wisdom about freeriding in administrative institutions, higher ranks in Russian 
bureaucracies are associated with less freeriding.  
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In this paper, I argue that religion matters for the provision of public goods in Russia. My 
evidence is drawn from public goods experiments that I ran with regional bureaucrats in the oblast 
administrations of Tomsk and Novosibirsk, Russia. The core principles of Eastern Orthodox 
monastic organization are solidarity, obedience and universal discipline. I model them into 
strategic games and then transform them into treatments in a series of public goods experiment. 
Moreover, I establish the Soviet system of bureaucratic incentives as the institutional bridge 
between post-Soviet Russian bureaucracies and Eastern Orthodox monasteries.  
In post-Soviet Russia there have been two critical and contradictory dimensions in the 
study of the bureaucracy. On the one hand, bureaucrats have been treated as one of the main 
factors for the country’s economic stagnation and institutional backwardness. Extensive 
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corruption, lack of technical skills, hoarding of state resources both under socialism and post-
socialism have been only a few of the negative aspects of the Soviet and Russian civil service. On 
the other hand, regional bureaucracies have been essential for tracing the pathways of policy 
implementation. Despite their financial constraints and deficiencies in vocational training, they 
perform a series of duties and services that link the federal government with businesses - domestic 
and multinational - aid organizations, and the lower half of the population’s income distribution. 
This is why regional bureaucracies form the ideal venue for the study of economic collectivism in 
the Russian Federation. Regional bureaucrats are components of the hierarchical monitoring 
structure, originating in the Kremlin and ending in municipalities and city districts. A public 
goods experiment that measures their degree of adherence to principles of Eastern Orthodox 
administrative organization can provide solid evidence on whether Eastern Orthodoxy has been 
an inherent part of Russian state culture and challenge the conventional wisdom of Soviet atheism. 
Following the line of Stark, Iannaccone, and Finke, I do not treat religion and political 
economy as antithetical (1996); on the contrary, I am convinced that religion can explain political 
and social phenomena away from the conventional labels of fundamentalism and irrationality. 
Different religions generate different types of distributive hierarchies. Second, I enrich the existing 
literature on religion and political economy by offering a political theory that refutes the basic 
premises of secularism and its proposed dichotomies between sacred and profane institutions.  
In this paper, my theoretical and experimental results on the effects of solidarity, obedience 
and universal discipline on the provision of public goods are not identical. The derived 
equilibrium solutions suggest that under solidarity the public good is not delivered, whereas 
under obedience and universal discipline is delivered. In all three cases, they are Nash equilibria in 
mixed strategies. In the OLS estimations of the experimental data, universal discipline induces 
higher contributions toward the public good at group and rank levels. This implies that - contrary 
to theoretical findings - obedience as an Eastern Orthodox principle does not have policy 
implications for the delivery of public goods by Russian bureaucracies. Furthermore, universal 
discipline leads to higher levels of private rewards both at group and rank levels. This set of 
observations leads to the definition of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy that advances individual 




ensuing learning process as a result of its imposition induce self-investment in the provision of 
public goods.  
I also find that the principal contributes more toward the public good than bureaucrats of 
rank 2 and 3. This suggests that the efficient preservation of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy 
requires a higher sacrifice from the leadership rather than lower administrative ranks. Thus, post-
Soviet authoritarianism, which is so often observed in countries with an Eastern Orthodox 
majority, is likely to endure, only if the political, administrative and economic elites are inclined to 
provide public goods above the citizenry’s overfulfillment threshold and relatively more than the 
lower ranks of the bureaucracy. In Eastern Orthodox hierarchies, the normative prerequisite for an 
efficient contribution increases discontinuously with rank.   
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I provide an overview of the literature and 
in section 3 I discuss the relationship between Eastern Orthodoxy and the provision of public 
goods in Russia. In section 4, I setup and solve a public goods game in its static and dynamic forms 
as they correspond to solidarity, obedience and universal discipline. The results of the model are 
tested empirically in section 5 which presents the experimental design. Results are reported and 
discussed in section 6. In section 7, I provide the conclusions.   
 
II. Literature  
 
Modern social science has defined religion in the form of institutional entities that 
complement or substitute state functions in the provision of social welfare. It has also treated 
religiosity as verbal adherence to the existence of God or membership to a religious community. 
Huber and Stanig argue that state provision of social services through local churches puts the 
religious and secular poor in competition against each other in democracies, because it favors the 
former at the expense of the latter (2011). Scheve and Stasavage propose that social insurance and 
religiosity are substitute mechanisms with respect to life’s adverse events and therefore shape 
people’s demands for welfare state provisions in opposite directions; more religious people are 
inclined to be less dependent on social insurance (2006). Based on World Values Survey data from 




finding justifies the use of non-economic factors in the study of economic behavior (2006). Gill and 
Lundsgaarde treat the welfare state as a substitute to social services provided by the local churches 
(2004: 399). They suggest that a strong welfare state is conducive to higher levels of secularization 
and thus modernization (2004).  
The historical variables of control, respect and obedience, which are invoked by Tabellini in 
his effort to explain regional variation in economic performance across Europe, offer an 
interesting, yet limited set of analytical conclusions (2010). Tabellini stresses the significance of 
culture for economic behavior and suggests that personal independence and social capital are 
crucial factors for economic development (2010). At the same time, the cultural division of labor 
constitutes a necessary, but not sufficient condition for class struggle; as long as a nondemocratic 
government is able to maintain the welfare of stratified workers at an acceptable minimum, the 
probability of revolution or loss of legitimacy of the incumbent government is definitely low 
(Hechter, 1978: 315-316).  
Public goods experiments usually take place in the form of classroom games; people sit in 
the same room, but do not have direct eye contact with each other. They also record their 
contributions per round on special earnings or payoff sheets (Holt and Laury, 1997). As Marwell 
and Ames indicate, while the weak free-rider hypothesis holds, the overall private contributions 
by experiment participants undermine the formal validity of that theory (1981). People may still 
contribute toward a public good, even if they consider the possibility that another group member 
will contribute less while hoping to free-ride on the rest of the society (Marwell and Ames, 1981). 
Ironically, only economists, when participating in the Marwell and Ames experiments, seem to 
validate by approximation the free-rider hypothesis (1981).  
Fehr and Gächter propose that cooperators prefer to impose punishments on free-riders, 
even when they are costly for them; they suggest that the presence of a punishment condition 
induces full cooperation among subjects that otherwise defect when there is a no-punishment 
condition (2000). Their theory of costly punishment finds particular application under Stranger-
treatment – when random group composition in each period occurs – rather than under Partner-
treatment – when group composition remains the same across periods (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 




cooperation; with the use of a contribution table, 50 percent of the subjects stated their intention to 
contribute more toward the public good if their co-players contribute more (Fischbacher, Gächter 
and Fehr, 2001). This observation – backed up by additional evidence from public goods games - 
adds a third category to cooperators and free-riders; reciprocators (Burlando, 2005). This is why a 
theory of heterogeneous agents and endogenous group formation can be particularly useful when 
there is no hierarchical relationship between experimental subjects (Burlando, 2005). 
As Palfrey and Prisbrey point out, experienced players are more stable and less altruistic in 
their contributions across periods, the more experience they accumulate (1997). They also show 
that not only the threshold level of the public good but also the marginal value of the private good 
influence each player’s contribution decision per round and per experimental session (Palfrey and 
Prisbrey, 1997). In his seminal article on public goods experiments, Andreoni proposes that 
strategic behavior or learning alone cannot account for decay in public goods experiments (1988). 
Partners contribute more to the public good than Strangers, and this may be due to the fact that 
Partners adjust their priors faster than Strangers to the collected sum in round n-1 of an n round 
experiment (Andreoni, 1988).  
This learning process becomes more effective when there is a concrete threshold to be 
achieved. The reason is that there is a binary dilemma imposed on experiment participants; to 
over- or under-contribute toward collective welfare. This is in line with Andreoni, who argues 
about the significance of social norms with respect to levels of cooperation (1988). Social norms 
may sustain a high level of cooperation in repetitive public goods games with a finite horizon, and 
thus induce learning ex-ante rather than ex-post. In my experiments, I make use of Partner-
treatment only and allow for hierarchical differentiation across group members. Eastern 
Orthodoxy is the singular common ground that can explain the existence of rigid yet collectivist 









III. Eastern Orthodoxy and the Provision of Public Goods in Russia 
 
Hierarchy, solidarity and universal discipline are central in Eastern Orthodox theology and 
organization. If the core of the Orthodox tradition - according to St. John the Chrysostom - is the 
idea that the state should imitate the norms and organization of the church in order to achieve its 
optimal form, then it is seems appropriate to test this idea with Russian bureaucrats at the 
subnational level. In his work on Russian intellectual history and the relationship between the 
individual and the collective, Kharkhordin draws the fascinating analogy between Soviet 
collectives and Orthodox congregations (2005: 51-56). His contribution lies primarily on political 
theory and the linkage between Byzantine patristics and Russian ecclesiastical thought as well as 
the influence of the former on religious practices and state structures in Russia from Kievan Rus to 
the Soviet Union.1 More specifically, he proposes that the Eastern Orthodox collective (on the basis 
of the Russian Orthodox Monastery and Soviet civil society) is bounded by the following 
principles: 1. Hierarchy, 2. Collective surveillance, and 3. Mutual assistance at the community level 
(2005: 51-56). Instead of focusing on the analogy between Soviet collectives and Orthodox 
congregations, I draw a much longer historical line between late Byzantium and post-Soviet 
Russia. Moreover, I trace the roots of Eastern Orthodox collectivism in Russia in the influence of 
Byzantium's Hesychast movement on Russia’s ecclesiastical thought and more importantly 
administrative structures. 
Joseph Volotsky, the abbot of Volokolamsk Monastery, has been one of the most influential 
figures in the definition of monastic organization in Russian Orthodoxy; his Brief and Extended 
Rules suggest a series of principles on what constitutes a monastic community, its core, boundaries 
and limitations (Goldfrank, 1975). In his approach of coenobitic life, he argues in the Extended 
Rule that mercy and charity are critical for the self-preservation of the monastery and its ability to 
fulfill its social welfare obligations, i.e. meeting the needs of the poor (Goldfrank, 1975). Moreover, 
he suggests that the monastery is a worldly institution and thus it is also defined by material needs 
and principles that may define also other forms of communal organization; contrary to Goldfrank 
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(1975), who understands the monastery as a reflection of Muscovy’s political and economic 
structures, I argue that the monastery itself perpetuates political and economic structures that have 
been far more ancient than Muscovy. 
The key distinction between Joseph Volotsky and Nil Sorsky, the Athonite monk who was 
Volotsky’s contemporary and equally influential in the Russian Orthodox Church, is the following: 
while Sorsky prioritized hermitage and Hesychast asceticism, Volotsky treated monasticism as a 
worldly elite institution. Penitence, material detachment and emotional indifference are some of 
the prerequisites of the Hesychast ideal of stillness, which lies in the core of Sorsky’s Byzantine 
Orthodox thought in early modern Russia (Goldfrank, 1975).  
This very idea of abstinence from property is central in the theological thought of St. John 
the Chrysostom, where the koinonia of resources is essential for the unity and utility of the church 
(Petrou, 1996). Nevertheless, koinonia is not only material; it also has a direct personal dimension, 
because property is only complementary to personal communication and human salvation 
through the community of persons. Hence, mysticism is not in opposition to asceticism; the 
Hesychast tradition suggests that the former should rather be seen as an extension of the latter 
(Buss, 1989). The end is Kaini Ktisi, the creation of a new world on the basis of Eastern Orthodox 
principles; the Church as an institution is a necessary prerequisite in that respect (Nissiotis, 1961). 
Thus, the Church in the Orthodox tradition becomes the paradigmatic structure for the state. The 
monastic community lies in the core of this administrative system. The mainstream position of the 
Hesychast tradition in Orthodox Christianity, within the boundaries of Byzantine Empire and 
beyond, and the willingness of the Emperor John VI Kantakouzenos to support the Hesychast 
cause confirm its key role in the development of the Orthodox commonwealth (Meyendorff, 1988).  
Marcuse, in his explanation of the new rationality emerged in the Soviet Union in the 
1920s, proposes that transition from capitalism to communism was conditioned by social 
processes, reinforcement of the state apparatus, elimination of competitive ideologies, achievement 
of a subsistence minimum, industrialization and agricultural collectivization (Marcuse, 1961: 63-
64). The formation of vertical and centralized administrative structures that proclaim to eradicate 




Nevertheless, the Soviet synthesis of common interest is elaborated in Marcuse as a negation of 
individual freedom and inequality (Marcuse, 1961: 100-103).  
This is why I treat orthodoxy and central planning as a continuum in terms of bureaucratic 
organization. They constitute the two leading cultural paradigms in Russian history since the 10th 
century, when the principality of Kievan Rus’ adopted Orthodox Christianity from Constantinople 
in 988 AD; they have both defined Russian identity in stark contrast with the West, whose main 
cultural elements have been capitalism and any of the two leading versions of Western 
Christianity, Catholicism or Protestantism (Makrides and Uffelmann, 2003). The imperial heritage 
of Byzantium constitutes a key component of Russia’s national self-consciousness (Papanikolaou, 
2003). Since the Byzantine emperor was seen as the representative of God and the Empire itself the 
depiction of the Divine Kingdom on Earth, Russia’s lack of democratic culture may be linked to its 
Eastern Orthodox tradition (Papanikolaou, 2003). Rational individualism is the cornerstone of 
Western Christianity and capitalism, as well as of capitalism’s political outgrowth: democracy. 
Rather than making an argument about the incompatibility of orthodoxy with democratic values 
and economic development, I define Eastern Orthodox collectivism as a form of political and 
economic organization, alternative to market economy and democracy, with distinctive 
microfoundations and bureaucratic characteristics.  
This abstinence of the Russian administrative state from the Weberian ideal type is linked 
to a strong commitment to communitarianism and the creation of relational rather than 
professional policy networks (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004). The size of the Russian civil service is 
considered to be inefficient and its education substandard by Western criteria; nevertheless, it 
fulfills multidimensional social functions (Brym and Gimpelson, 2004). Although it is not accurate 
to define Russia as collectivist and the West as individualist in an exclusive way, it is certainly the 
case that the Russian administrative state has determined the concept of economic and political 
community in a radically different way than its Western counterparts (Stoeckl, 2007: 6-12). The 
government is not just the collective representation of citizens’ individual interests. It serves 
broader social functions that transcend the boundaries between what we perceive as public and 
private; education, healthcare, energy regulation and transportation are critical policy areas, where 




activities. On the contrary, it has the absolute authority in defining public interest, since it controls 
all governance structures in the Russian society, both vertical and horizontal.  
The ability of the Russian executive to enforce collaborative rather than competitive 
structures in the provision of public goods is due to a mix of repressive technology and 
transactional efficiency. Thus, the Russian administration becomes the embodiment of family and 
community values at the macro-level. Selective resonance to contract enforcement and judicial 
institutions does not mean that resource allocation occurs without the existence of functioning 
institutions (Hendley, Ryterman and Murrell, 1999).2 The Russian administrative state is a complex 
organization of overlapping hierarchies, subject to scrutiny and control by immediate supervisors; 
this is why any trace of administrative justice in Russia is certainly not a victory of citizens against 
local or federal arbitrariness (Solomon, 2004: 574-575).  
The political economy of democratic reform in the 1990s has been severely criticized for its 
intent to destroy the collectivist core in Russia’s political and economic system and substitute it 
with a privatized version of the state, which would have no distributive obligations toward the 
citizens (Guriev and Rachinsky, 2005). This is why the democratic experiment failed in Russia: 
because instead of becoming the principled polity of the middle class, democracy was treated as 
equivalent to an arbitrary form of government, run by privatized state elites. The icon of the state, 
perpetuating the Byzantine political tradition of the Emperor, constitutes a solid ideological 
stronghold, which is defined by the divide-and-rule principle vis-à-vis the citizens, and constrains 
any major form of civic organization. Civicness and trust as alternative foundations of governance 
are seen as threats to community cohesion, because they limit the role of the state as supplier of 
public goods and social services. This multiplicity of organizational forms facilitates high levels of 
administrative corruption, mainly targeted at small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which play 
by default a minor role in generating public goods for the government and hence contributing to 
regime legitimacy (Safavian, 2001).   
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Unity rather than diversity, and the perception of a super state that embodies collective 
interests and has messianic traits are in the core of both Marxian and Byzantine political traditions 
(Rothbard, 1990). Unlike Protestant bureaucracies, where ex-ante enforcement mechanisms form 
the basis of state-society relations and social trust, in post-communist Russia the minimization of 
exogenous risk, and thus the maintenance of a rational hierarchy forms the basis of administrative 
decision-making and public goods distribution (Rubin, 1994). Treating communism as Russia’s 
civil religion and orthodoxy as the primary form of theological expression in Russian history may 
provide the cultural foundations of bureaucracy and regime formation in post-Soviet Russia, both 
under Yeltsin and Putin (Dinello, 2003).  
 
IV. The Model 
 
How can these arguments be formally developed? Modeling the Russian bureaucracy as a 
hierarchical organization that operates on the basis of obedience, solidarity and universal 
discipline provides a baseline for the experimental results that I am presenting in subsequent 
section of this paper.  
Standard Form with Rank Differentiation 
I assume an administrative agency with three different administrative ranks: 11 =n  and
321 nnn << , which means that the principal of the administrative agency is singular, and the 
lower the administrative rank the higher the number of the agents. I assume a linear utility for all 
three ranks, which has the following structure: 
( )i i i i i iU χ θ β θ= − + Ζ  
where iχ is the initial endowment of any bureaucrat i where i=1, 2, or 3, iθ  is his monetary 
contribution toward the public good, iΖ  his private rewards from the delivery of the public good, 
which is monotonically decreasing in iθ , iβ  is a parameter between 0 and 1, which denotes the 




Each bureaucrat does not know if the other one will provide adequate contribution toward 
the public good. There are four possible events:  
1. Bureaucrat i overfulfills and bureaucrats –i underfulfill ˆ ˆs.t.   and  i i i iθ θ θ θ− −≥ <   
2. Bureaucrat i underfulfills and bureaucrats –i overfulfill ˆ ˆs.t.   and  i i i iθ θ θ θ− −< ≥  
3. All types of bureaucrats overfulfill ˆ ˆs.t.   and  i i i iθ θ θ θ− −≥ ≥  
4. All types of bureaucrats underfulfill ˆ ˆs.t.   and  i i i iθ θ θ θ− −< < .3  
where iˆθ  is the exogenous threshold for overfulfillment. If all types of bureaucrats overfulfill, the 
public good is certainly delivered. If all types of bureaucrats underfulfill, the public good is 
certainly not delivered. If bureaucrat i underfulfills and bureaucrats –i overfulfill, then both 
outcomes are likely. The same holds, when bureaucrat i overfulfills and bureaucrats –i underfulfill. 
The probability of overfulfillment is denoted as ˆ( ) ( )ii ip pθ θ θ≥ =  and the probability of under-
fulfillment is ˆ1 ( ) ( )ii ip pθ θ θ− ≥ = . Moreover, because the public good is delivered if and only if t  
is reached, there is a discontinuity in the payoffs around threshold t . I assume that private rewards 
from non-delivery have the form ,t ti i iC
σ σ> ≤Ζ = Ζ −  where σ is the sum of contributions provided 
by all bureaucrats and iC  is the cost of free-riding, which is monotonically decreasing in iθ . 
Therefore, I rewrite the utility payoffs as follows: 
ˆ ˆ ( )[ ( )] ( )[ ( ) ( )], if   and 
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≤ − + Ζ + > − + Ζ − < ≥
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− + Ζ ˆ ˆ   and 
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ), if   and 
i i i i
t
i i i i i i i i i i i iC
σ
θ θ θ θ










− + Ζ − < <
It is important to mention here that ( )ip t σ≤ is the probability of threshold fulfillment if 
bureaucrat i overfulfills and bureaucrats –i underfulfill, and ( )i tλ σ≤ is the probability of 
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threshold fulfillment if bureaucrat i underfulfills and bureaucrats –i overfulfill. Based on the 
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The first-order conditions have the following form: 
ˆ ˆ( ) 1, if   and  
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By the implicit function theorem I define )( iii q −= θθ . Therefore, the second-order conditions for 
the principal have the following form: 
1
12 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 12 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
12 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 12 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) , if   and 
ˆ( ) ( ) , if   and
q C Z Cp t p t
q C Z Ct t
D Lθ
σ σ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
λ σ λ σ θ θ







  ∂ ∂ Ζ ∂ ∂ ∂
= − − > − > ≥ <  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  
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= − ≥ ≥ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
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2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 22 2
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2
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The same assumption holds also for the 
extension I present here. This means that the higher the contributions of bureaucrats of rank 2 and 
3, the lesser the contribution of the principal. The same holds symmetrically for bureaucrats of 
rank 2 and 3. There is no reason for him to contribute more, if he can achieve the same public good 
payoff by contributing the least to it. The standard public goods game with linear payoffs 
identifies two types of Nash equilibria (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). The first one is a Nash 
equilibrium in pure strategies where everybody bids zero such that .0321 === θθθ  The second 
one is also a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies where everybody bids the same monetary 
contribution such that ,i
t
N
θ = where N is the total number of players.  
In my propositions below, I provide the Nash equilibria derived from my extension to the 
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=  and his contribution such that 
2 3
1 1 1 1, 0,0
ˆ ˆlim  inf  { : } .
θ θ
θ θ θ θ
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≥ =  This is a Nash equilibrium in mixed 
strategies and a weakly dominant strategy as it implies the existence of a continuum of Nash equilibria.  
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C Z
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3 3 3 3
C Z
θ θ θ θ− −
∂ ∂
≥
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 2 2
, ( ) ( )p t tσ λ σ> > >  and 3 3( ) ( )p t tσ λ σ> > > , then 
bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 set their contributions such that 
1 1 1 1
2 3ˆ ˆ
lim ( ) 0,  lim ( ) 0 p t p t
θ θ θ θ
σ σ
→ →
> = > =  and 
1 3 1 1 2 1
2 2 2 3 3 3ˆ ˆ, ,0 , ,0
ˆ ˆlim  inf  { : } 0 and lim  inf  { : } 0.
θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ
→ →
< = < = This is a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies 
and a weakly dominant strategy as it implies the existence of a continuum of Nash equilibria.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 
As indicated in the second-order conditions matrices of the principal, if 
2 2
1 1
1 1 1 1
C Z
θ θ θ θ− −
∂ ∂
≥
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
and
1 1( ) ( )p t tσ λ σ> < > , then the principal has an incentive to overfulfill at the minimum level 1ˆθ . 
More specifically, if his individual cost of non-delivery is higher than the individual welfare from 
delivery and if the probability of non-delivery for the public good is lower when he overfulfills 
than when he underfulfills, then the principal has an incentive to set the threshold equal to the 
minimum level m, assuming that the contributions of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 tend to zero.   
Proof of Corollary 1a 
As indicated in the second-order conditions matrices of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3, if 
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2 2 2 2
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, ( ) ( )p t tσ λ σ> > >  and 3 3( ) ( )p t tσ λ σ> > > , then 
bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 have an incentive to underfulfill, assuming that the principal is better 




t m= , so that his own contribution has a limit in 1ˆθ , as the contributions of bureaucrats of ranks 2 
and 3 approximate zero if and only if 1 2 3( ) ( ) ( )p t t tσ λ σ λ σ< > < > <  
In a public goods game with hierarchical differentiation, the principal contributes the 
infimum of his overfulfillment space, whereas bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 contribute the infimum 
of their respective underfulfillment spaces. Both the principal and lower-level bureaucrats have an 
interest in the delivery of the public good; the comparative income advantage of the principal 
makes his own contribution critical for this outcome. Therefore, without his overfulfillment the 
public good is not going to be delivered, as the principal anticipates that bureaucrats of ranks 2 
and 3 have an incentive to freeride. At the same time, bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 decide to 
freeride, as they expect that the principal is better off by offering a contribution. The equilibrium 
set has the following form:  
2 3 1 3 1 1 2 1
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1ˆ ˆ, 0,0 , ,0 , ,0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{lim  inf  { : }, lim  inf  { : },  lim  inf  { : }} { ,0, 0}.
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
→ → →
≥ < < ⇒   
Thus, the public good is not delivered in the standard form as 1ˆ .mθ <   
Solidarity  
I now assume that the bureaucrats decide about whether to deliver a social good. This is 
not for the general public, including themselves, but it addresses the needs of poorer and more 
disadvantaged members of the society. The differences from the standard form model are the 
following: 
1. The private rewards payoff from solidarity is lower than the private rewards payoff from 














and ,ii βγ <  where 
σ≤1t
iY  
denotes the private rewards from solidarity derived by the bureaucrat.  
2. The private rewards payoff from solidarity is divided by ,λτ p where λ is the total 
population, and pτ  is the percentage of poor people in any society. The utility payoffs have 
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and 1 1( ) ( )p t tσ λ σ> < > , then the principal sets the threshold t  such that 
1 1ˆ
lim ,t k
θ θ ε→ −
=  and his contribution 
such that 
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< = −   where ε is the difference between 
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This is a Nash equilibrium in 
mixed strategies and a weakly dominant strategy as it implies the existence of a continuum of Nash equilibria. 
 
Corollary 2a: If +∞→pτ , then there is no incentive for any player to contribute toward the social good such that .0321 === θθθ  




Proof of Proposition 2 
The principal is even less incentivized to contribute toward the social good, and thus he 
underfulfills. This is why his contribution is now located in the upper bound of his under-
fulfillment space. Solidarity does not make bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 improve their 
contribution: they are expected to freeride here as well, as per proposition 1.  
Thus, the equilibrium has the following form:   
1 3 1 1 2 12 3
1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1ˆ ˆ, ,0 , ,0, 0,0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{lim  sup  { : }, lim  inf  { : },  lim  inf  { : }} { ,0, 0}.
θ θ θ ε θ θ θ εθ θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ ε
→ − → −→
< < < ⇒ −  
Proof of Corollary 2b 
It is defined that as pτ  increases, iY  monotonically decreases. Thus, if pτ  approximates infinity, 
then iY  approximates zero and hence there is no incentive of contribution toward the social 






I now assume that bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 are monitored by their respective 
immediate supervisors (the principal and bureaucrats of rank 2). It is possible to set up a 
dynamic game with two periods: 
1. In period 1, the process is the same as in the standard form. After period 1 is 
completed, the principal and bureaucrats of rank 2 learn the contributions of their 
respective supervisees.  
2. In period 2, immediate supervisors punish their supervisees by freeriding under two 
conditions: 
a. The public good was not delivered in period 1, and  
b. Their contribution was below the overfulfillment threshold .ˆ 1−θ   
Immediate supervisors have a binary choice: 1. To repeat the standard form game in two 
periods (ex-ante monitoring), or 2. To learn the outcome and contributions of their immediate 
supervisees and then freeride or not (ex-post or Bayesian monitoring). Thus, the ex-ante 
monitoring payoff for all three types of players is the following:4 
                                                          
4 The logic of my model follows the two-period gradualism model in Roland Gérard. Transition and 
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Under Bayesian monitoring, the principal has learned the performance of bureaucrats of 
rank 2, and bureaucrats of rank 2 have learned the performance of bureaucrats of rank 3. The 
contributions of bureaucrats of rank 2 form a signal for the principal that can influence his own 
contribution in round n+1. The same holds for bureaucrats of rank 2 with respect to the 
contributions of bureaucrats of rank 3. The less a supervisee contributes in period 1, the more 
likely it is that he will be punished with non-delivery also in period 2. The immediate 
supervisor makes him pay the cost of non-delivery by deciding to freeride. The continuation 
payoffs in that case can be written in the following form: 
2 2 2
3 3 3
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Bureaucrats of rank 2 know in advance that the principal will check on their 
performance after period 1 is over, and bureaucrats of rank 3 know in advance that bureaucrats 
of rank 2 will check on their performance after period 1 is over. Thus, freeriding may not be the 
most efficient strategy in this game, because information revelation can create freeriding 
incentives for immediate supervisors and thus prevent delivery of the public good. The 
introduction of two competing modes of efficiency with distinctive religious characteristics is 
prevalent here. The ex-ante continuation payoff does not consider the respective contributions of 
bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 in period 1. It is a dynamic form of the standard public goods 
game. Under ex-ante efficiency, there is no opportunity of benevolent performance for 
bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3.  
I suggest that dynamic freeriding embodies a Protestant worldview on state-society 
relations and class stratification. Bureaucrats care about the delivery of the public good to the 
extent that it does not diminish their private rewards from delivery. This rule that has 
dominated the political economy of collective action is only partially true and refers mainly to 
Protestant societies with a small state and a disciplinary version of bureaucratic rationality. This 




On the contrary, the introduction of obedience in the form of strategic adjustment to the 
perceived expectations of immediate supervisors allows bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 to show the 
degree of their distributive commitment in period 1. This monitoring structure has two unique 
elements: 1. It has a learning effect on the contributions of immediate supervisors in period n+1, 
and 2. It creates a hierarchical accountability dilemma for hierarchically-inferior bureaucrats in 
period 1. Bureaucrats of rank 2 both learn the performance of rank 3 bureaucrats and are 
hierarchically accountable to the principal for their own performance in period n. Hence, 
obedience corresponds to a non-individualist worldview on public goods provision.  
Hierarchically lower bureaucrats become aware that there is a smaller probability that 
the public good will be provided in round n+1 if they freeride in period n, and immediate 
supervisors are enforced to think beyond their private endowment and preserve their 
hierarchical authority. This is the Orthodox worldview in bureaucratic organization and the 
public sector. Rather than performing cross-rank equalization to the bottom, the Orthodox-
minded bureaucrat takes into account his own hierarchical position, which defines the degree of 
his distributive commitment, while accounting for the contributions of others. Under conditions 
of obedience or hierarchical accountability, everybody is given the opportunity to strategically 
adjust its strategy so that there is a better opportunity for the provision of the public good. 
Individual repentance rather than individual punishment lies in the core of Eastern Orthodox 
theology and is reflected in what I define as Bayesian monitoring.  
If hierarchy preservation lies in the core of an efficient Orthodox bureaucrat, then the 
system of linear payoffs for all ranks has the following form: 
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Similarly, for bureaucrats of rank 2:  
3 3 3 3
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which is the hierarchical budget constraint imposed on bureaucrats of rank 2 who are both 
monitored by the principal and monitor bureaucrats of rank 3, and 2µ  is a parameter.  
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Proposition 3: Obedience is more likely than ex-ante efficiency to lead to public goods provision. 
Corollary 3a: Bayesian monitoring weakly dominates ex-ante (synchronic) monitoring such that
iknik WSH i ≥− )( 1  and 2 2 3 3ˆ ˆ ,n n tθ θ π+ + ≥ where 
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Proof of Proposition 3 
To show that obedience is more likely to lead to public goods provision than ex-ante efficiency, I 
show that Bayesian monitoring weakly dominates ex-ante (synchronic) monitoring. The ex-ante 
monitoring payoff for bureaucrats of rank 2 is 22 2( )W θ = 21 2 21 2(1 ) ( ) max ( )W Wδ θ δ θ− + and their 
Bayesian monitoring payoff is:  
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where )( 221 θW  is a payoff function, discontinuous at t , and it is possible for bureaucrats of rank 
2 either to contribute below or above 2θˆ . However, they are incentivized to contribute at least 
2θˆ  under obedience (right-hand side payoff), because the principal can find out whether they 
freeride and reduce his own contribution toward the public good to such an extent that the 
public good is not delivered. In that case, freeriding does not make them better off. For a 
bureaucrat of rank 2, the principal’s threat for free-riding in case he contributes below 2θˆ  is 
relatively more credible than an underfufillment signal of any bureaucrat of rank 3. Thus, given 
their dual function in this type of game, bureaucrats of rank 2 have higher incentives to 
contribute rather than freeride at the expense of the collective, even when their supervisees of 
rank 3 do so. Bureaucrats of rank 3 contribute less consistently above 3ˆθ , because they do not 
have any immediate supervisees and thus they do not know how much the other members of 
the collective contribute. The principal enforces rather than tolerates obedience. Nevertheless, 
he is also more likely to increase his contribution under obedience such that 0>π because his 




bureaucrats (rank 2) for the benefit of the principal and low-level bureaucrats (rank 3). Thus, the 
equilibrium has the following form:   
2 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 2 3ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , , ,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ{ lim  inf { : } , lim  inf  { : },  lim  inf  { : }} { , , }.
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It becomes obvious, that while the principal free-rides, bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 do not. The 
public good is delivered under the conditions that 2 2 3 3 1 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ and .t n nθ θ θ π θ π≤ + + − ≥  
Proof of Corollary 3a 
It follows from the proof of proposition 3.  
If Protestantism and Eastern Orthodoxy are the individualist and collectivist corners of 
Christianity, then synchronic and Bayesian monitoring are their equivalent structures in 
administrative organization and policy enforcement. The Protestant immediate supervisor 
assumes that there is no need for learning in period 1 about the performance of the bureaucrats 
that he supervises. On the contrary, he treats private consumption as more important than the 
delivery of the public good. The Eastern Orthodox immediate supervisor treats public goods 
delivery as a strictly dominant strategy over private consumption. The existence of the tradeoff 
between ex-ante efficiency and obedience provides useful insights about the religious origins of 
public goods distribution by administrative agencies.  
Universal Discipline 
I now assume that the principal can punish bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 in period 2, if the 
public good is not delivered in period 1. The model is set up as follows: 
1. In period 1, I assume that the public good is not delivered such that 
2 2 3 3 1 .n n tθ θ θ+ + <  
2. In period 2, the principal enforces a planned contribution on all bureaucrats of rank 2 
and rank 3 such that 2 2 3 3 1 .
p pn n tθ θ θ+ + =  
3. In period 3, bureaucrats of rank 2 and rank 3 are allowed to contribute freely toward 
the public good. The idea is that they will contribute in the interval ],ˆ[ 111 −−− ∈ χθθ , as 
a result of the previously enforced discipline. The discipline is defined as universal 
because it does not distinguish between bureaucrats that did free-riding and those 




counter-freeriding by the immediate supervisor, here the principal enforces 
horizontal and rank-differentiated penalties on his supervisees in round n+1.  
The principal’s payoff has the following form: 
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Similarly for bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3,  
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Just like under obedience, the principal expects the other bureaucrats to abide at least by the 
minimum standard .ˆ 1−θ  The difference is that now he has the ability to directly enforce it. The 
effects of this principle are traced in period 3 when bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 are free again to 
choose independently their contribution to the public good.  
Proposition 4: Under universal discipline, the principal sets p2θˆ  and 
p
3ˆθ such that 01 =θ and
2 2 3 3
p pn n tθ θ+ ≥ .   












This is a weakly dominant strategy and a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, as ),ˆ( 222 χθθ ∈  and 
).,ˆ( 333 χθθ ∈  
Universal discipline can also be defined as disciplinary monitoring. Therefore, the following 
proposition holds:  






Corollary 5a: The public good is more likely to be delivered under disciplinary monitoring rather than 
under Bayesian monitoring.  
Proof of proposition 4 
Because the principal can enforce rank-differentiated penalties on his supervisees, he has the 
incentive to transfer the total cost of public good delivery onto them and free-ride at their 
expense.  




Because in period 2 (universal discipline) the principal almost confiscates the initial endowment 
of bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 such that p2θ is in the neighborhood of 2χ  and 
p
3θ in the 
neighborhood of 3χ , in period 3 bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 contribute more than the 
hierarchically defined minimum 1ˆ−θ and less than their initial endowment .1−χ They have the 
incentive to be at least as worse off as under period 2, because that way they will ensure that no 
further punishment by the principal occurs in any of the following rounds. Therefore, their 
contribution set lies in the open interval ),ˆ( 11 −− χθ . In this case, the principal also bids zero, 
because the threshold he set is reached anyway.  
Proof of proposition 5 
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because p2θ is in the neighborhood of 2χ  and therefore the public good is definitely delivered, 
whereas the only case where the same certainty holds under obedience is when 
321 2 n 3 3ˆ
( |S , , ).W tθ σ θ θ≤ ≥  Moreover, 2θ  lies in the open interval ),ˆ( 22 χθ , and therefore 
bureaucrats of rank 2 will always contribute more in period 3 of universal discipline rather than 
in period 2 of obedience. Hence, the public good is more likely to be delivered that way as well. 
The same holds for the principal and bureaucrats of rank 3. The marginal utility from private 
rewards of the public good delivery will always be higher for any bureaucrat under universal 
discipline rather than under obedience.  
Proof of corollary 5a 
It follows from the proof of proposition 5.  
Thus, the equilibrium has the following form:   
2 3 2 3 1 3 3 1 2 2
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Universal discipline is the most effective mechanism for the provision of public goods in 
an Eastern Orthodox bureaucracy. The imposition of planned contributions in period 2 induces 
alignment of hierarchically lower bureaucrats with the expectations of the principal for the 
purpose of collective welfare. There is a progressive increase of contributions across principles 
such that obedience and universal discipline can form a continuum of degrees in Eastern 
Orthodox collectivist enforcement, which can also be observed with different variations in Islamic 
and Catholic economic systems.  
 
V. Experimental Design 
 
The public goods experiment, which I ran, involved bureaucrats in the multifunctional 
centers for the provision of state and municipal services as well as the regional administration 
headquarters in the cities of Tomsk and Novosibirsk. Bureaucrats have the professional duty to 
deliver public goods. I tested the extent to which the principles that defined both Soviet 
collectives and Orthodox monasteries hold when it comes to the contemporary Russian 
bureaucracy. 
I selected 8 bureaucrats based on their availability during their lunch break. I made sure 
that they understand the rules of the experiment and were willing to participate into it. They sat 
in the same room, but they had no eye contact with each other. I assigned them randomly to 
three groups of different administrative rank. Each rank corresponded to a different income 
level: 15,000 RUB for the principal, 10,000 RUB for bureaucrats of rank 2 and 7,000 RUB for 
bureaucrats of rank 3. These monetary rewards were nominal due to financial constraints and 
current political restrictions.  
Rank 1 had 1 member, rank 2 had 3 members and rank 3 had 4 members. The threshold 
of the public good was set by the principal (rank 1) given the constraint that 15,000 RUB < 
Threshold Public Good < 73,000 RUB (Cadsby and Maynes, 1999). When the public good was 
not reached, all of them lost L = 5,000 RUB. If the public good was reached, they gained M = 
2,500 RUB so that M < L. I repeated the experiment on ten different days with multiple 
combinations of bureaucrats and administrative ranks. It was possible that a bureaucrat 
participated in more than one experiment, but never in the principal position more than once 




I applied the following treatments to find whether the principles of Eastern Orthodox 
monasticism are reflected on Russia’s current administrative structures and the provision of 
public goods: 
Treatment 1 (Standard Form with Rank Differentiation and Thresholds): No information 
exchanged among the experiment subjects. This is the standard public goods experiment.  
Treatment 2 (Solidarity): It was announced to the subjects that they were now contributing toward a 
social good such as the construction of a house for disabled or elderly people or a kindergarten.   
Treatment 3 (Obedience): Each bureaucrat was obliged to report her contribution to her immediate 
supervisor after each round has been completed.  
Treatment 4 (Universal Discipline): Each bureaucrat was obliged to report the contribution that the 
highest bureaucrat in the group hierarchy decides for her in round n+1, if the public good was not 
delivered in round n. The principal enforced such penalties on bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3, so that the 
public good is delivered.  
As it has been aforementioned, treatments 2-4 are defined as degrees of Eastern Orthodox 
collectivism or rather degrees of Eastern Orthodox collectivist enforcement. Each experiment is run for 
fifteen rounds per treatment. I ran a total of ten experimental sessions. The hypotheses I tested 
are the following:   
Hypothesis 1: The public good is more likely to be delivered under treatment 4 rather than under any 
other treatment. 
Corollary 1a: Bureaucrats of all ranks are likely to contribute more toward the public good under 
treatment 4 rather than under any other treatment.  
This hypothesis is the first application of my theory on the degrees of Eastern Orthodox 
collectivist enforcement. Universal discipline is treated as the most effective form of 
enforcement in an administrative agency that imitates the organizational principles and 
structures of the Eastern Orthodox monastery. This hypothesis is a behavioral extension of the 
equilibrium solutions proposed in the formal part of this paper, where the abrogation of the 
bureaucrat’s attachment to private benefits is more likely to lead to the fulfillment of the defined 
threshold value. Patriarchal social structures, collectivist perceptions of property and welfare, 
and surveillance incentives render more likely the fulfillment of collective welfare under a 
quasi-planned administrative system, where every bureaucrat has to abide by the authority of 




Hypothesis 2: The principal is likely to freeride more than bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 under treatment 
4 rather than under any other treatment. 
This hypothesis is a second-order condition of the first one. Now, instead of looking at 
the fulfillment of the threshold value, I look at the cross-round and cross-treatment 
contributions of the principal. Universal discipline allows him to freeride much more than 
under obedience, solidarity or the standard form, because in that case he has the information 
monopoly and this does not reduce the probability of public goods delivery. 
It is important to note that the mirror hypothesis here is that bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 
will freeride progressively less across these four treatments. My expected outcome is the inverse 
of the previous hypothesis: universal discipline rather than hierarchy or solidarity motivates 
agents to abide by the rules of the administrative collective.   
Hypothesis 3: Average group profit is likely to be higher under treatment 4 rather than under any other 
treatment. 
Corollary 3a: Average rank profit is likely to be higher under treatment 1 rather than under any other 
treatment. 
The logic here is straightforward. The higher the degree of Eastern Orthodox collectivist 
enforcement the higher the average group profit due to the delivery of the public good. The 
opposite holds for the rank level: the higher the degree of Eastern Orthodox collectivist 
enforcement the lower the average rank profit because the delivery of the public good occurs at 




I ran 10 experiments with all 4 treatments and one experiment only with treatments 1 
and 4. The experiments run in Tomsk I code as TM and the experiments run in Novosibirsk as 
NK. The first number denotes the experiment and the second the treatment. Thus, TM11 
denotes the first treatment of the first experiment in Tomsk. To present cross-treatment and 
cross-session effects, I summarize the results by breaking the results both by experiment and by 
treatment. Thus, I provide the following set of experiments in Tables 1-4: TM11-TM14, TM21-
TM24, TM31-TM34, TM41-TM44, TM51-TM54, TM61-TM64, NK71-NK74, NK-81-NK84, NK91-




toward the public good in three-period intervals. Because each experiment has fifteen rounds, 
there are five three-round periods per experiment. Tables 2-4 cluster for rank: they summarize 
average rank contribution for ranks 1, 2 and 3. Per Cadsby and Maynes, I count both the times 
that the threshold public good is achieved in the last three periods and the times it is achieved 
overall (1999).   
Tables 1-4 (see below Appendix B) summarize the experimental data per group (Table 1) 
and rank (Tables 2-4).  In times that the public good is provided under treatment 4, the times 
where the principal-planner enforces provisions are not counted. The logic is to see how many 
times group cooperation occurs as a learning result of universal discipline rather than to add 
times of public good delivery that did not occur as an outcome of voluntary cooperation. The 
same assumption holds for the other three treatments, but without excluding instances of 
threshold achievement. This is why average group and rank contributions as well as times of 
public good delivery are measured both in their overall means and in periodic intervals. Table 1 
provides a very interesting overview of the cross-treatment levels of average group 
contribution. Under treatment 2 (solidarity), average group contribution is lower than under 
treatment 1 (standard game). Moreover, under treatment 3, experiment participants contribute 
more than under treatment 1 or 2, while treatment 4 induces the highest levels of average group 
contribution so that 
4 3 2 1
.T T T TAGC AGC AGC AGC> > >  This means that solidarity may not 
constitute a degree of Orthodox collectivist enforcement. The perspective of contributing to the 
provision of a social good for the more disadvantaged members of the society are going 
discouraged Siberian bureaucrats from contributing a higher percentage of resources out of 
their initial endowment. Nevertheless, obedience and universal discipline seem to persist as 
enforcement mechanisms in Russian subnational institutions.  
In tables 2-4, average contributions are summarized per rank. The distribution of 
experiment participants into three ranks with a single principal-planner allows the 
identification of treatment effects per rank and thus provides some useful findings about the 
provision of incentives at different hierarchical levels of an administrative agency. The 
strategies of the principal and bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 become clear at this point. The 
principal, whose contributions are presented per treatment in table 2, not only does not freeride, 
but he also makes the highest contributions toward the public good. What the descriptive data 




contribution in order to deliver the public good in terms of initial endowment percentage (their 
initial endowment is 7,000 RUB). Similarly, there is a considerable contribution gap between the 
principal and bureaucrats of rank 2, whose initial endowment is 10,000 RUB. These preliminary 
observations are tested in conjunction with the aforementioned H1-3.  
Tables 5 and 6 provide OLS estimations where standardized average group and rank 
contributions – both at aggregate and last three-period levels – as well as standardized average 
group and rank profits are regressed on treatment and – where applicable – rank dummies 
(fixed effects). 
 In figure 1 (see below), average group contributions under all three treatments are 
plotted jointly across experiments - TM1, TM2, TM3, TM3A, TM4, TM5, TM6, NK7, NK8, NK9, 
TM10. The average distance between the threshold and the average group contribution line per 
experiment is progressively smaller in treatments 3 and 4 compared to treatment 1, whereas the 
biggest average distance per experiment is observed for treatment 2. This confirms the initial 
observations drawn from tables 1-4. Average group contributions under treatment 4 
approximate the threshold line in each experiment more than any other treatment. Treatment 3 
line offers a second-best approximation, while treatment 2 increases the average distance of 
bureaucratic contributions from the set threshold. Delivery of the public good is more likely to 
be observed only under conditions of Bayesian and collectivist disciplinary monitoring. Russian 
bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 are more inclined to abide by the institutional principles of Eastern 

















In table 5 (see below), I present the OLS estimations of my data at the group level. 
Average group contribution overall, average group contribution in the last three periods and 
average group profit are standardized with respect to the threshold and used interchangeably 
as dependent variables. I run the model with treatment dummies and use treatment 1 (standard 
form game) as a reference variable. Treatment 4 is positively significant at the 5 and 1 percent 
levels, when the dependent variable is average group contribution at the aggregate level and 
average group profit respectively. Treatment 2 is negatively significant at the 5 percent level in 
my second model, when the dependent variable is average group contribution in the last three 
periods of the experiment. Thus, H1 and H3 are not rejected.  
What we learn from the group level results is that:  
1. Treatment 4 has a positive effect both on average group contribution at the aggregate 
level and on average group profit. Thus, universal discipline does not suggest that 




of the Siberian bureaucracy. This observation underpins the concept of an Eastern 
Orthodox hierarchy, where hierarchical provision of public goods does not occur at the 
expense of efficiency.  
2. Treatment 2 has a negative effect on average group contribution in the last three periods. 
The more the participants adjust to the rules of the experiment the less willing they 
become to contribute toward a social good that is directed only to disadvantaged 
members of society. Solidarity with the poor is confirmed not to be a degree of Orthodox 
collectivist enforcement, but it is more likely to be observed in market- rather than plan-
based religions. It requires an efficient horizontal network of public goods provision 
rather than an efficient centralizing hierarchy.  
Table 5 
   OLS Results 
   
 
Average Group  
Contribution 
Average Group  
Contribution (Last Three Periods) 
Average Group  
          Profit 
Treatment 2 Yes 
-0.11 
                           (-2.32)** Yes 
Treatment 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment 4 
0.12 
   (2.33)** Yes 
0.28 
      (3.32)*** 
Intercept  
0.86 
     (25.06)*** 
0.94 
      (29.37)*** 
0.34 
      (5.74)*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.25 
No of observations 40 40 40 
Note: Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
T-statistics are in parentheses. Treatment 1 is a reference for Treatments 2, 3 and 4.  
 
Table 6 (see below) reports the OLS estimations at the rank level. The dependent 
variables are now the standardized average rank contributions overall and in the last three 
periods as well as the standardized average rank profit – all with respect to initial endowment 
per rank. Treatment 4 is positively significant at the 1 percent level in the average group profit 
model; bureaucrats of all ranks gain more on average when treatment 4 is implemented. Thus, 
C3a is rejected. Moreover, in my sample I have not traced a causal relationship between 
treatment dummies and average rank contribution at the aggregate and three-last-period levels. 
On the contrary, bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 freeride consistently more than the principal. 
Rank 2 and 3 dummies are positively significant at the 1 percent level in all three models. When 




the sign of the coefficients is negative. When the dependent variable is average rank profit, the 
sign of the coefficients is positive.  
What we can infer from the OLS results of table 6 is the following: 
1. Treatment 4 makes all bureaucrats better off, as it increases the probability of public 
good delivery, when the punishment period is over. This finding introduces the idea of 
an efficient hierarchy that treats collective and individual welfare as complements rather 
than as substitutes. The fact that treatment 4 works for the experimental group of 
Siberian bureaucrats may explain why unitary organizations, central planning and 
vertical planning have had such endurance in Russian administrative organization and 
economic policy.  
2. Bureaucrats of ranks 2 and 3 are freeriding at the expense of the principal. This is a 
finding contrary to the conventional wisdom about post-communist bureaucracies. The 
supervisees are inclined to be relatively more corrupt than the supervisor. This is the 
case both in terms of contributions and in terms of accumulated profit. Repression is a 
very singular way to explain corruption and authoritarian success in the Eastern 
Orthodox - and possibly Muslim - lands of the former Soviet Union. The leader needs to 
contribute a minimum toward the common pool that has to be higher than the relative 
contributions of his citizens. What I infer for political regimes holds also for ministries 
and administrative agencies.  
Table 6 
   OLS Results 
   
 
Average Rank  
Contribution 
Average Rank  
Contribution (Last Three Periods) 
Average Rank  
Profit 
Treatment 2 Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Treatment 4 Yes Yes 
0.18 
      (5.82)*** 
Rank 2 
-0.12 
      (-2.63)*** 
-0.17 
      (-4.98)*** 
 0.08 
      (3.14)*** 
Rank 3 
-0.14 
      (-2.98)*** 
-0.18 
      (-5.36)*** 
 0.08 
      (3.11)*** 
Intercept 
0.64 
    (13.89)*** 
0.75 
    (22.04)*** 
0.14 
    (5.30)*** 
Adjusted R-squared 0.05 0.22 0.32 
No of observations 120 120 120 
Significance levels: * 0.05 < p < 0.10, ** 0.01 < p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. T-statistics are in parentheses.  







In this paper I analyze Eastern Orthodoxy as an administrative culture. With a regional 
focus on Russia, I argue that there is a continuity of administrative norms in the organization of 
Eastern Orthodox monasteries and post-Soviet bureaucracies. The principal – the abbot-
equivalent of the Byzantine and Russian monastery – cares about the enforcement of the public 
good threshold decided by him. This is why under disciplinary monitoring he threatens 
bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 with confiscation of their total income if they contribute less than a 
minimum threshold 1θˆ− , which is different for ranks 2 and 3. This explains why universal 
discipline weakly dominates the standard ex-ante monitoring. For similar reasons, Bayesian 
monitoring is preferred to ex-ante monitoring. Under Bayesian monitoring, the principal learns the 
actual contribution of his immediate supervisee in period n and strategically adjusts in period 
n+1. The same holds for bureaucrats of rank 2, after they have observed the contributions of 
bureaucrats of rank 3.  
The experiments I ran with bureaucrats in the oblast administrations of Tomsk and 
Novosibirsk suggest the existence of an Eastern Orthodox hierarchy that defines distributive 
efficiency in post-Soviet Russian bureaucracies. The principal contributes the most toward the 
public good, while bureaucrats of rank 2 and 3 contribute progressively less. Universal 
discipline induces both higher levels of contribution and higher profit at the group and rank 
levels. There is an interesting conclusion to be drawn here about collectivism and the nature of 
post-Soviet Russian bureaucracy. Unlike in Protestant societies, freeriding is more likely to 
occur at lower rather than at higher hierarchical levels. Russian administrative principals are 
more public-minded than their supervisees, because they continue the line of Soviet bureaucrats 
and the latters’ Orthodox institutional vocation. Universal discipline in the form of treatment 4 
is necessary to preserve administrative hierarchies and facilitate public goods provision at a 
minimum threshold. Eastern Orthodoxy has strong political and economic implications. The 
ideal-type of the Orthodox administrative state is defined by disciplinary enforcement and self-
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Experimental Instructions  
This is an experiment on group decision-making. You are randomly assigned into one out of 
three groups: 1, 2 or 3. Each group corresponds to a different administrative rank, with 1 being 
the highest rank. The session will last for fifteen periods per method. In each session you will 
have to decide how much of your initial private endowment you will contribute to the 
threshold public good. The value of the threshold public good is defined by the highest-ranked 
group - group 1 - given the constraint 15.000 RUB < Threshold Public Good < Total Private 
Endowment. 
Method 1: 
You have fifteen information sheets in front of you. On each of these you will write date and 
time, your assigned group, the value of the threshold public good and the value of your 
contribution. If you belong to group 3, your initial individual income is 7000 RUB, if you belong 
to group 2, your initial individual income is 10000 RUB, and if you belong to group 1, your 
initial individual income is 15000 RUB.   
You will be asked to record the number of cards that you contribute to the public good privately 
on your information sheet within three minutes. Then raise your hand, and I will come to 
collect your information sheet. When all of you are finished I will sum up your contributions to 
the public good and will announce if the threshold is met. In case it is met, all of you earn M = 
2.500 RUB. In case it is not met, all of you lose L = 5.000 RUB. Then, you may calculate your net 
payment on your net payment sheet. For example the income of a group 3 member is 7.000 RUB 
and his contribution 3.000 RUB; if the threshold public good is not reached, then his net 
payment is 7000 – 3000 – 5000 = - 1000 RUB ~ 0 RUB, which becomes zero for the purposes of 
our experiment, and if the threshold public good is reached, then 7000-3000+2500= 6500 RUB. 
Your initial income in the beginning of each round is unaffected by your net payments in the 
previous round. In the end of the experiment I will collect your net payment sheets. Examples 
of a public good can be a bridge, a park or a public hospital. You are definitely going to use it 
during your lifetime.  
Method 2: 
This procedure is the same as above. The only difference is that this is a threshold social good, 




disabled people. Examples of a social good can be a kindergarten, an elderly care house or a 
community house for disabled people. You may or may not use it during your lifetime.  
Method 3: 
This procedure is the same as above. The only difference is that in the end of each round, I will 
report your contribution to your immediate supervisor only (the contributions of group 3 
members to group 2 members and the contributions of group 2 members to the group 1 person).  
Method 4: 
The procedure is the same. The only difference is that if the threshold value is not reached in the 
end of any round, groups 2 and 3 will have to make the contribution that group 1 person 





Summary of Experimental 
Results 
        
 
Average Group Contribution 
     




Periods 1-3 Periods 4-6 Periods 7-9 Periods 10-12 Periods 13-15 Overall Periods 13-15 Overall Threshold 
Treatment 1: Standard Form 
         TM11 30,967 34,833 34,433 39,067 34,500 34,760 0 3 40,000 
TM21 25,367 25,067 34,733 32,100 46,200 32,693 0 0 52,000 
TM31 36,667 35,667 37,833 51,333 45,167 41,333 1 2 50,000 
TM41 34,833 26,167 38,767 47,500 44,500 38,353 1 3 50,000 
TM51 42,033 40,867 44,367 42,867 44,867 43,000 1 5 45,000 
TM61 41,833 38,000 36,133 46,233 41,000 40,640 1 7 42,000 
NK71 47,333 52,333 57,667 63,000 68,833 57,833 2 2 70,000 
NK81 42,833 46,033 41,000 39,833 42,700 42,480 1 6 45,000 
NK91 33,933 40,433 41,167 37,833 36,667 38,007 0 4 40,000 
TM101 41,167 44,167 40,833 45,667 45,167 43,400 2 4 47,000 
Treatment 2: Solidarity 
         TM12 31,667 31,433 32,200 35,733 38,333 33,873 1 1 40,000 
TM22 23,767 38,167 27,767 23,100 43,433 31,247 0 0 52,000 
TM32 47,000 46,167 45,333 44,167 38,000 44,133 0 2 50,000 
TM42 26,433 26,100 21,933 26,267 27,933 25,733 0 0 50,000 
TM52 35,667 34,333 36,000 36,467 37,867 36,067 0 0 45,000 
TM62 39,167 31,333 38,000 28,333 35,333 34,433 0 3 42,000 
NK72 60,833 61,333 62,567 57,333 55,461 59,506 0 0 70,000 
NK82 44,000 43,667 43,433 42,567 37,000 42,133 0 4 45,000 
NK92 41,000 37,167 36,700 41,000 39,333 39,040 2 5 40,000 
TM102 33,833 46,833 48,333 47,633 46,500 44,627 1 8 47,000 
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Treatment 3: Obedience 
         TM13 35,967 40,600 39,833 41,833 40,500 39,747 2 7 40,000 
TM23 39,100 41,900 45,500 49,000 49,000 44,900 1 2 52,000 
TM33 40,333 35,070 31,500 32,333 36,500 35,147 0 0 50,000 
TM43 47,500 48,000 49,667 50,000 49,667 48,967 1 7 50,000 
TM53 44,867 47,633 44,600 44,333 44,400 45,167 1 9 45,000 
TM63 40,333 34,833 34,000 44,333 42,533 39,207 1 7 42,000 
NK73 52,817 46,433 49,333 50,783 50,866 50,047 0 0 70,000 
NK83 42,333 40,667 43,833 44,133 45,767 43,347 1 6 45,000 
NK93 36,533 37,833 37,017 40,000 42,700 38,817 2 4 40,000 
TM103 45,000 46,500 44,833 51,333 41,167 45,767 0 8 47,000 
Treatment 4: Universal 
discipline 
         TM14 42,667 41,500 44,000 40,367 38,933 41,493 0 8 40,000 
TM24 41,367 49,233 42,367 47,533 38,833 43,867 0 2 52,000 
TM34 51,667 50,333 54,167 57,333 45,000 51,700 0 4 50,000 
TM44 44,167 48,000 39,000 46,000 41,333 43,700 0 0 50,000 
TM54 45,253 45,633 45,100 46,800 45,763 45,710 1 5 45,000 
TM64 36,667 42,167 42,333 40,667 47,167 41,800 2 3 42,000 
NK74 57,667 69,333 65,667 69,600 63,067 65,067 0 0 70,000 
NK84 46,000 44,100 44,800 46,000 48,500 45,880 3 7 45,000 
NK94 37,833 48,667 41,700 46,500 40,517 43,043 2 8 40,000 




Summary of Experimental 
Results 
        
 
Average Rank Contribution: 
Rank 1 
     




Periods 1-3 Periods 4-6 Periods 7-9 Periods 10-12 Periods 13-15 Overall Periods 13-15 Overall Threshold 
Treatment 1: Standard Form 
         TM11 8,333 9,500 9,533 9,833 10,667 9,573 0 3 40,000 
TM21 6,000 6,333 9,667 7,333 12,833 8,433 0 0 52,000 
TM31 10,000 10,000 10,000 13,333 10,000 10,667 1 2 50,000 
TM41 12,667 13,000 11,000 14,000 14,000 12,933 1 3 50,000 
TM51 8,000 7,667 9,333 8,667 9,333 8,600 1 5 45,000 
TM61 12,333 10,333 9,667 12,333 11,333 11,200 1 7 42,000 
NK71 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 2 2 70,000 
NK81 6,333 9,000 7,667 9,000 10,000 8,400 1 6 45,000 
NK91 12,667 9,333 12,000 12,667 13,000 11,933 0 4 40,000 
TM101 7,333 8,333 9,333 10,000 10,000 9,000 2 4 47,000 
Treatment 2: Solidarity 
         TM12 10,667 12,333 11,667 13,333 14,000 12,400 1 1 40,000 
TM22 3,667 7,667 5,333 3,167 8,500 5,667 0 0 52,000 
TM32 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 10,000 14,000 0 2 50,000 
TM42 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 0 0 50,000 
TM52 7,000 7,667 7,333 6,667 8,667 7,467 0 0 45,000 
TM62 10,000 11,167 7,000 7,000 7,667 8,567 0 3 42,000 
NK72 13,833 14,833 14,900 15,000 15,000 14,713 0 0 70,000 
NK82 10,000 11,000 11,000 9,000 9,000 10,000 0 4 45,000 
NK92 11,667 8,000 8,000 11,000 14,000 10,533 2 5 40,000 
TM102 8,667 9,000 9,000 8,333 9,667 8,933 1 8 47,000 
Treatment 3: Obedience 




TM23 7,667 12,000 12,333 11,333 13,333 11,333 1 2 52,000 
TM33 13,333 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,667 0 0 50,000 
TM43 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 13,000 1 7 50,000 
TM53 9,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 9,800 1 9 45,000 
TM63 10,000 6,000 11,000 10,667 9,000 9,333 1 7 42,000 
NK73 14,767 14,700 14,867 15,000 14,933 14,853 0 0 70,000 
NK83 6,000 5,000 7,333 9,333 8,333 7,200 1 6 45,000 
NK93 12,667 12,000 8,000 11,000 13,333 11,400 2 4 40,000 
TM103 9,000 8,667 10,000 10,000 10,000 9,533 0 8 47,000 
Treatment 4: Universal 
discipline 
         TM14 12,000 12,000 13,000 12,400 12,133 12,307 0 8 40,000 
TM24 10,000 7,500 9,667 7,167 8,667 8,600 0 2 52,000 
TM34 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 11,667 14,333 0 4 50,000 
TM44 10,333 9,000 9,000 11,000 12,000 10,267 0 0 50,000 
TM54 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 1 5 45,000 
TM64 9,667 9,667 9,000 9,000 8,000 9,067 2 3 42,000 
NK74 14,333 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 14,867 0 0 70,000 
NK84 10,000 5,333 5,000 7,333 7,000 6,933 3 7 45,000 
NK94 10,333 8,667 7,333 8,000 8,000 8,467 2 8 40,000 




Summary of Experimental 
Results 
        
 
Average Rank Contribution: 
Rank 2 
     




Periods 1-3 Periods 4-6 Periods 7-9 Periods 10-12 Periods 13-15 Overall Periods 13-15 Overall Threshold 
Treatment 1: Standard Form          
TM11 3,500 5,444 5,278 6,278 4,667 5,033 0 3 40,000 
TM21 3,333 3,889 4,556 4,222 5,444 4,289 0 0 52,000 
TM31 4,722 4,722 5,222 7,778 6,611 5,811 1 2 50,000 
TM41 4,000 2,889 5,833 5,944 5,389 4,811 1 3 50,000 
TM51 6,400 5,844 5,622 5,956 5,511 5,867 1 5 45,000 
TM61 5,333 5,444 4,778 6,444 5,444 5,489 1 7 42,000 
NK71 4,444 6,000 7,667 9,222 9,667 7,400 2 2 70,000 
NK81 5,222 5,111 3,833 3,611 3,778 4,311 1 6 45,000 
NK91 4,278 6,444 4,667 5,556 5,611 5,311 0 4 40,000 
TM101 5,333 5,111 4,833 4,500 4,444 4,844 2 4 47,000 
Treatment 2: Solidarity          
TM12 4,056 3,211 4,889 4,444 4,111 4,142 1 1 40,000 
TM22 3,444 6,222 3,333 2,778 7,556 4,667 0 0 52,000 
TM32 6,611 6,278 4,667 3,333 4,333 5,044 0 2 50,000 
TM42 2,111 2,333 1,778 2,667 3,889 2,556 0 0 50,000 
TM52 6,000 6,000 6,000 5,822 5,733 5,911 0 0 45,000 
TM62 5,111 2,333 5,000 3,222 4,778 4,089 0 3 42,000 
NK72 9,222 9,389 9,278 8,556 7,889 8,867 0 0 70,000 
NK82 4,667 4,333 4,778 4,833 3,833 4,489 0 4 45,000 
NK92 5,778 5,722 6,167 6,556 5,000 5,844 2 5 40,000 
TM102 3,444 5,000 5,889 6,211 5,278 5,164 1 8 47,000 
Treatment 3: Obedience          
TM13 4,944 6,611 5,778 6,556 5,833 5,944 2 7 40,000 
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TM23 5,722 4,667 4,889 6,889 5,889 5,611 1 2 52,000 
TM33 4,722 4,167 3,333 4,056 3,944 4,044 0 0 50,000 
TM43 6,778 6,556 7,000 6,444 6,778 6,711 1 7 50,000 
TM53 6,178 6,822 6,700 6,667 6,522 6,578 1 9 45,000 
TM63 5,000 4,889 3,444 7,556 7,556 5,689 1 7 42,000 
NK73 7,000 4,778 5,544 6,700 6,033 6,011 0 0 70,000 
NK83 4,611 4,333 4,722 4,889 4,833 4,678 1 6 45,000 
NK93 4,667 5,333 5,667 7,000 6,389 5,811 2 4 40,000 
TM103 5,222 6,500 5,167 7,278 4,333 5,700 0 8 47,000 
Treatment 4: Universal 
discipline 
         
TM14 6,667 6,278 6,333 6,044 5,600 6,184 0 8 40,000 
TM24 5,778 7,278 5,278 7,056 4,111 5,900 0 2 52,000 
TM34 6,278 5,889 6,333 7,333 4,667 6,100 0 4 50,000 
TM44 6,333 7,000 5,333 6,444 5,333 6,089 0 0 50,000 
TM54 6,467 6,711 6,700 6,711 6,756 6,669 1 5 45,000 
TM64 3,556 5,778 6,111 6,111 7,222 5,756 2 3 42,000 
NK74 7,667 9,389 8,444 9,733 9,167 8,880 0 0 70,000 
NK84 5,500 5,444 5,111 6,444 6,444 5,789 3 7 45,000 
NK94 4,778 7,222 6,333 6,000 5,500 5,967 2 8 40,000 




Summary of Experimental 
Results 
        
 
Average Rank Contribution: 
Rank 3 
     




Periods 1-3 Periods 4-6 Periods 7-9 Periods 10-12 Periods 13-15 Overall Periods 13-15 Overall Threshold 
Treatment 1: Standard Form          
TM11 3,033 2,250 2,267 2,600 2,458 2,522 0 3 40,000 
TM21 2,342 1,767 2,850 3,025 4,258 2,848 0 0 52,000 
TM31 3,125 2,875 3,042 3,667 3,833 3,308 1 2 50,000 
TM41 2,542 1,125 2,567 3,917 3,583 2,747 1 3 50,000 
TM51 3,708 3,917 4,542 4,083 4,750 4,200 1 5 45,000 
TM61 3,375 2,833 3,033 3,642 3,333 3,243 1 7 42,000 
NK71 4,750 4,833 4,917 5,083 6,208 5,158 2 2 70,000 
NK81 5,208 5,425 5,458 5,000 5,342 5,287 1 6 45,000 
NK91 2,108 2,942 3,792 2,125 1,708 2,535 0 4 40,000 
TM101 4,458 5,125 4,250 5,542 5,458 4,967 2 4 47,000 
Treatment 2: Solidarity          
TM12 2,208 2,367 1,467 2,267 3,000 2,262 1 1 40,000 
TM22 2,442 2,958 3,108 2,900 3,067 2,895 0 0 52,000 
TM32 3,042 3,083 4,083 4,792 3,750 3,750 0 2 50,000 
TM42 1,775 1,525 900 1,317 817 1,267 0 0 50,000 
TM52 2,667 2,167 2,667 3,083 3,000 2,717 0 0 45,000 
TM62 3,458 3,292 4,000 2,917 3,333 3,400 0 3 42,000 
NK72 4,833 4,583 4,958 4,167 4,199 4,548 0 0 70,000 
NK82 5,000 4,917 4,525 4,767 4,125 4,667 0 4 45,000 
NK92 3,000 3,000 2,550 2,583 2,583 2,743 2 5 40,000 
TM102 3,708 5,708 5,417 5,167 5,250 5,050 1 8 47,000 





TM13 2,617 3,025 2,875 2,542 2,750 2,762 2 7 40,000 
TM23 3,567 3,975 4,625 4,250 4,500 4,183 1 2 52,000 
TM33 3,208 3,143 2,875 2,542 3,667 3,087 0 0 50,000 
TM43 3,542 3,833 3,917 4,417 4,083 3,958 1 7 50,000 
TM53 4,333 4,292 3,625 3,583 3,708 3,908 1 9 45,000 
TM63 3,833 3,542 3,167 2,750 2,717 3,202 1 7 42,000 
NK73 4,263 4,350 4,458 3,921 4,458 4,290 0 0 70,000 
NK83 5,625 5,667 5,583 5,033 5,733 5,528 1 6 45,000 
NK93 2,467 2,458 3,004 2,000 2,550 2,496 2 4 40,000 
TM103 5,083 4,583 4,833 4,875 4,833 4,842 0 8 47,000 
Treatment 4: Universal 
discipline 
         
TM14 2,667 2,667 3,000 2,458 2,500 2,658 0 8 40,000 
TM24 3,508 4,975 4,217 4,800 4,458 4,392 0 2 52,000 
TM34 4,458 4,417 5,042 5,083 4,833 4,767 0 4 50,000 
TM44 3,708 4,500 3,500 3,917 3,333 3,792 0 0 50,000 
TM54 3,963 3,875 3,750 4,167 3,874 3,926 1 5 45,000 
TM64 4,083 3,792 3,750 3,333 4,375 3,867 2 3 42,000 
NK74 5,083 6,542 6,333 6,350 5,142 5,890 0 0 70,000 
NK84 4,875 5,608 6,117 4,833 5,542 5,395 3 7 45,000 
NK94 3,292 4,583 3,842 5,125 4,004 4,169 2 8 40,000 
TM104 4,167 4,708 4,483 4,225 4,654 4,448 0 7 47,000 
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